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Gelişimsel Bir Siyasi Ekonomi İçin Eylem Bağımsızlığının Sorgulanması
Özet
Kendisine eşlik eden bir post-modem kültürel mantıkla yükselen neo-liberalizm bir yandan
genelleştirilen kodlara dayalı sosyal projelerin geçerliligine son verirken, bir yandan da liberalizmin özünü
degiştirmektedir. Genelleştirilen kodlann yıkımı ilk bakışta bireysel hak ve özgürlükleri genişletiyor
görünmektedir. Buna karşın, ekonomik ve siyasi alanlar arasında içsel bir çelişki belirmektedir. Genel
kodlann yıkımı bireysel haklan tanım gereili arttırmaktadır çünkü kişisel farklılık noktalannın kimlik
konumlanması ile birlikte sürdürülebilirliginin tanınması bireyin seçim hakkını olanaklar bakımından
çogaltmaktadır. Ne var ki bireysel haklann çogalmasının yanında kişisel özgürlügün gizli bir daralmayla
sınırlandıgı gerçeili .de mevcuttur çünkü bireyin kendini oluşturma süreci, iletişimin güdümsel bir nitelik
kazandıgı zamanda adeta imkansızlaşmaktadır. Bu bakımdan bireyin yer aldıgı çevrenin incelenmesinin yanı
sıra, bireyin kişisel eylemlerini somutlaştırdıllı girişimlerin ahlaki ya da gayn ahlaki olmasına bakılmaksızın
hangi ölçülerde dış faktörlerle şekillendirilmekte olduguyla, söz konusu tutumlarm ne ölçüde kişinin kendi
hür iradesiyle yapılandırdıllının sorgulanması, bireyin ve toplumun sistem içerisindeki konumunun
belirlenmesindeki nihai anlam olarak belirme~tedir .
Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberalizm, neo-liberalizm, post-modernizm, etik, siyasi ekonomi.
Abstract
The rise of neo-liberalism with a post-modem cultural logic that accompanies it not only outdates
social projects based on general codes, but also hampers the essence of liberalism. At first sight, desttuction
of general codes seems to enlarge individual rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, there occurs an implicit
discrepancy between economic and political domains. Destruction of general codes by definition increases
individual rights because emancipation of every individual idiosyncrasy as a means of identity positioning
quadruples the options for individual choices. However, enlargement of rights take place with a clandestine
shrivel of individual freedom because it has become almost impossible to achieve self-realizing under omni-
presence of dominative communication. Therefore, along with the environment that covers individual, the
ultimate meaning of individuaI's and society's positioning within the system passes through judgment of the
deed by interrogating whether individual expressions have been shaped by external factors no matter whether
be it deterrnined on the basis of ethical or non-ethical; or whether individual's initiatives are outcome of
hislher free will whether be it deterrnined on the basis-of ethical or non-ethical.
Keywords: Liberalism, neo-liberalism, post-modemism, ethics, political economy.
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Judging the Autonomy of Deed for Progressive
Political Economy
Introduction
Strict categories that define thinking and acting with regard to solid
definition of right-wrong, good, bad ete. are being totally outdated by the rise of
competitive individualism that goes beyond a war of possession and reaches a
war of identity expression. This is why general codes such as Platonic (PLA TO,
BI 375) or Kantian (KANT, 1785, 1788, 1790) understanding of individual and
society seem no more relevant for contemporary society as stated respectively
by Annas and Gulyga (ANNAS, 1981; GULYGA, 1987). General codes are
be ing challenged by the idea that emancipation of every individual
idiosyncrasy, with no regard to its ethical affıliation as far as it does not harın
the existence of the Other, reflects the broadest range of rights and freedoms. in
other words, individual rights and freedoms outdate the social responsibilities,
which are assumed to limit the first without considering the deviations from the
general. Asking "why responsibility at al!" is nothing but begging. the question
by the mere fact of posing it; for whoever poses such a question has aIready
assumed that the ego's "concem for itself' is the first and last word. The
expectation that responsibility could be legitimated and founded would be out.
of place; it would be like asking Plato why everything should aspire to the
Good or asking Kant why we should follow the categorical imperative
(WALDENFELS, 1995: 49).
The idea of psychological egoism (HOBBES, 1651; SMITH, 1776;
BENTHAM, 1789) is becoming self-evident in compatible with society's
evolution, which is currently based on competitive individualism both in
political and economic domains. Nevertheless, the fact that such understanding
dilutes not only the social aspect of the society but also the essence of
individualism is something ignored (BAUMAN 1992, 1998). At this paint,
there occurs a significant deviation from contemporary understanding of
.1
.! ~
i
i
Mert Bilgin e Judging the Autonomy of Deed for Progressiye Political Economy e 53
individualism when compared with its original sense as described by the
forefathers such as Hobbes, Smith and Bentham. Political economy of
individualism as brought out by these theoreticians is necessarily linked to
psychological egoism, but with emancipation of the contingency of human's
malleable nature's progress under certain principles (BAUMGARDT, 1952;
GERT, 1967: 503-520; TEICHGRAEBER, 1986).
Within this sense, this artide aims to bring out negative extemalities
brought by popular emancipation of the assumption, which believes that
"destruction of the general codes expands individual freedom" not by referring
to deontological understanding in order to depict new categorical imperatives,
but rather by putting emphasis on the idea of individual freedom through
axiological understanding. What had once been emphasized by the forefathers
of individualism as the general milieu was nothing more than a check and
balance system that tried to emancipate individual rights and freedoms at the
broadest possible leveL. Nietzschean liberalization of the individual from the
general environment, or this check and balance system, can be considered as a
means of expanding rights and freedoms (LAMPERT, 1987). At first sight, the
death of Go(o)d implies the collapse of morality which challenges the strict
rationality of modem ages. Nevertheless identification of acting against the
ethical as if it is ultimate expansion of individual freedom if it does not harın
the existence of the Others takes place along with serious misidentification
(DELEUZE, 1983). Such a system works for individual freedom only if the
concemed self has already accomplished self-realizing process. However, since
the modem ages dandestine tools of hegemony based on the abuse of
communicative skills leave no room for individual self-creation. This is why
Baudrillard's depiction of the contemporary capitalist reproduction
(BAUDRILLARD, 1981, 1987) should be considered with regard to Jameson's
argumentation of post-modemism as cultural logic of Iate capitalism
(JAMESON, 1991). Indeed, since the very beginning of life the individual
becomes oppressed by the bombardment of symbols and other communicative
attacks most of which are currently being shaped along direct or indirect
consumption motives. Therefore, the demi se of morality takes place with the
implosion of the self. Such misidentification becomes more problematic by the
dandestine tools of hegemony all derived from hyper-realities produced
through dominatiye communication skills (DELEUZE/GUATTARI, 1977;
ROJEKlTURNER, 1993). Ironically any loyalty to general codes is doomed to
fail under the expansion of individualism which poses strong arguments.
Hence, it becomes necessary to go beyond a mere analysis of deoritology that
searches what ought to be done and refer to theory of value as axiology which
here refers not only to judgments of value, extrinsic or intrinsic, moral or non-
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moral but also judgment of the judgment on the individual basis (RUNES,
1976: 99). Within this perspective, the main hypothesis of this artiele suggests
that the demise of the contingency of general codes increases the significance
of individual judgments along which not only idiosyncratic understanding of
life, but also the extent of individual freedom becomes shaped both in political
and economic domains. What constitutes the rationality of judgment, no mater
whether be it related to wisdom (or any other personal acuity that may even
contradict with what is assumed to be wise) should first of all reflect the free
will of the self. This necessitates going beyond a mere understanding of ethics,
or a contingent positioning against it. Indeed in an era characterized by
communicative domination and antagonisms among various identity positions,
there can be no other way than tojudge the autonomy of the deed with regard to
individual aUitudes in order to discern genuine individual freedom and sincerity
of relationships.
1. Judging the ethical
Ethics is to a large extent accepted as a realm and/or discipline of
judgments in terms of approval and disapproval, rightness, wrongness,
goodness, badness, vİrtue, vice, dispositions, ends, objects and state of affairs.
Interestingly, all of the phenomena related to ethics appear to be a part of
politics in terms of regime, state, ideology, international relations, economics
and even religion. It is impossible to point out an era, where judgments about
the above-mentioned ingredients of ethics have not been made. A part from the
judgments, it is self evident that the correlation amongst human beings
necessarily takes place with some consequences, some of which are good, right,
and/or respectable while the others are bad, wrong and unrespectable.
To simplify, the need to differentiate between the good and the bad has
always been real and vitaL. Hence, the very beginning of human history does
not differ so much from the contemporary world in terms of the existence of the
good and the bad. Consequently, the necessity of defining the good and the bad
has prevailed as one of the most critical questions of human history. This is
why ethics had always been a significant concem of the individuals and
societies long before the civilizations of Greece and Rome. Among these, two
great Mediterranean nations made a contribution upon what is called as
European heritage of ethics. "For a variety of reasons the Greek approach to
ethics was intellectual rather than emotional, philosophical rather than religious,
and moderate rather than extreme: for the Greeks, the main question of ethics
was " how can i live the good life?" and by "the good life" they meant primarily
a happy or satisfactory life" (PURTn...L, 1976: 131-132).
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To what extent it can be possible to define some phenomena as good and
right, while attributing the bad and the wrong to the rest, has always been a very
complex problem to solve. What gains ethics a peculiar characteristic in terms
of historical background is its existence since the very early times of humanity.
it is self-evident that, a kind of ethical concem should correlate with individual
judgments. Whilst, it is also a very evident fact that the meaning and
import;mce of ethics may vary due to some circumstances in terms of time and
place. The main vacillation arises from the fact that it is erninently a very
laborious task to evaluate a general theory of ethics which can be commonly
accepted. The most significant question arises as why what had once been
called as unethical becomes accepted today, and why what is accepted to day
may not be approved in the future. Other wise what is called ethical becomes a
domain through which certain cadres within the society re-produce themselves.
in spite of the fact that there exist various approaches, it seems appropriate to
analyze at least one of the sound theories of ethics in terms of not defining the
good and the bad, but in order to indicate the problematic consequences of such
a theoretical approach. Interestingly, the criticisms that can be applied to the
relevant theoretical approach will also be potent enough to be applicable to
every theory, which claims to define the good, right, bad and the wrong.
Ethical judgments fall, roughly, into two classes, (a) judgments of value,
Le. judgments as to the goodness or badness, desirability or undesirability of
certain objects, ends, experiences, dispositions, or state of affairs, e.g.
"Knowledge is good," (b) judgments of obligation, Le. judgments as to the
obligatoriness, rightness or wrongness, wisdom or foolishness of various
courses of action and kinds of conducts, judgments enjoining, recommending or
condemning certain line s of conduct. Thus there are two parts of ethics, (1) the
theory of value or axiology, which is concemed with judgments of value,
extrinsic or intrinsic, moral or non-moral, (2) the theory of obligation or
deontology which is concemed with judgments of obligation (RUNES, 1976:
99).
The ultimate aim of the deontology is to clear out the things that are good
or better. Within this perspective, goodness may imply a relative understanding
that differs according to subject, place and time. it mayaıso be hypothesized
that, goodness arises from an emotive understanding that is strictly adhered to
the individual. Finally, it is also possible to reach at the idea that goodness is an
intrinsically possessed property. The good may be identified by satisfaction,
pleasure as well as knowledge and virtue. Nevertheless, in each of the cases the
initiative of the individual for the concem ofsatisfaction, pleasure, knowledge
and wisdom may turn into a self deception when theyare the outcomes of the
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individual' S interaction with the general macro or micro environment. The
answer may change according to the relevant subject, time and place because
axiology is highly related to these concepts. in addition to axiologyand
deontology, it is also indispensable to point out that teleology can be considered
as a distinct understanding of ethics. in contrast to mechanism, which explains
the present and the future in terms of the past, teleology explains the past and
the present in terms of the future. Within this perspective, both the religious and
scientific teleology refer to what is ought to be done but through different
means (RUNES, 1976: 98-100). Therefore, it seems a very intricate assignment
to differentiate these two ways of ethics. Whilst, whether be it possible to reach
at a general theory of ethics or not, the main problem still remains because
referring to the ethical, the unethical or non-ethics may be invoking a kind of
relinquishment of some privileges obtained from the actual act, which is related
to external impulses that constitute the dominatiye communication.
It is obvious that, axiology coincides with the quest for the direction of
the behavior, while deontology indicates the things that have to be done. in
spite of the fact that, many thinkers pay more attention on deontology daiming
that one must know what ends are good before one can know what acts are to
be performed, both of the aspects should be considered as a whole. Axiology
seems of significance especially for the fact that it attempts to elucidate whether
it is possible to define goodness or noİ. This should be considered as anatural
consequence of the fact that, whenever an individual is at stakes of choosing
amongst decisions, slhe is at the same time at crossroads between judgments.
Therefore, in contrast to the idea which suggests that ethics coexists with
social norms and value s with no regard to the individual value, it is argued in
this study that individual and social aspects of ethics spontaneously coexisİ.
This division may at first sight seem as a very simplistic method of
understanding one of the most ethereal concepts of human history, however it
must be remembered that just like the simplicity of two hydrogen and an
oxygen, the bare content of the ethical embodies the endowment to induce the
characteristic of not only the socio-economic, but also the political and the
cultural strata of life. Hence, initiating from a very distinct ramification of
ethics it is possible to reach at the ground for the contradiction which is
essential for the dialectical kernel of life. in other words, there is no way other
than judging the judgment in order to indicate to what extent the individual
initiative in terms of acting or thinking is an outcome of hislher free. will which
necessitates axiological analysis rather than deontological conceptualization.
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2. Judging the deed
The definition of the ethical is very hard to clarify due to its relativity.
Whilst, if the term good is identified with the interest, while the bad with the
detriment at the most simplistic way, then it tums out to be possible to
determine some ways in terms of the relations between individual and the rest
vis-a-vis ethical judgments. Indeed moving from this definition does not only
allow construction of a deed category but also reflects the essence of
contemporary liberal economy derived from Benthamite-Smithian postuIate.
Consequently, an analysis of behaviors in terms of deed at the most possible
simplistic way may be helpful (PURTllL, 1976: 20-21).
1) Decent Behavior (g G)
Doing something good for oneself in order to bring about good for others
Example: Someone who enjoys singing sings for old people at a rest
home in order to helpthem enjoy the holiday.
2) Altruistic Behavior (b G)
Doing something bad for oneself in order to briİıg about good for others
Example: A friend of the singer who has no special talent and dislikes
washing dishes after a party so that the rest home staff can have a holiday.
3) Malicious Behavior (g B)
Doing something good for oneself in order to bring about bad for others
Example: The singer practices some of her favorite songs Iate at night
with the window open in order to annoya grouch neighbor.
4) Spiteful Behavior (b B)
Doing something bad for oneself in order to bring about bad for others
Example: The grouch neighbor gets out of bed and stands in his old
garage in his pajamas running his power in order to get back at the singer.
5) Self-serving Behavior (G g)
Doing something good for others in order to bring about good for oneself
Example: The singer gives a concert which is enjoyed by the audience,
but her only motiye is her own enjoyment and the concert fee.
6) Selfish Behavior (B g)
Doing something bad for others in order to bring about good for oneself
Example: The singer's manager steals the box-office receipts and flies off
for a luxurious vacation in Europe.
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7) Self-torturing behavior (G b)
Doing something good for others in order to bring about bad for oneself.
Example: The singer's ex-boyfriend takes the singer and her new husband
out to dinner, knowing it will make him feel terrible to see their happiness.
8) Self-destructive behavior (B b)
Doing something bad for others in order to bring about bad for oneself.
Example: The singer's manager continues to steal from others, knowing
he will soon be caught and imprisoned.
This schematic diagram is of course a very artificial and a very limited
way of understanding the role of ethical judgments which are concemed in
human relations. Within the mere perspective of this diagram, one may
condude that Marx and Hitler have both been ethical at the same level due to
their decent characters aimed to attempt the good for others. This is anatural
consequence of the fact that this chart ignores, (as Purtill accepts) various cases
such as g.....g - B .....B - as well as more coniplex series such as g.....(B and G)
This diagram may be very useful to indicate that the relations amongst
individuals refer to something more than being intrinsically good or bad. Most
of the time, these possibilities co-exist with no regard to the subject, varying
according to time, place and the object. Therefore, in order to build upon this
simplistic diagram it seems to be a very appropriate method to illustrate some
contingencies vis-Cı-vis the above-mentioned basic attitudes, and the political
actions. By the help of this illustration, it will be explicit, how easily the
political actions can be categorized in terms of simple daily attitudes.
The decent behavior (g G) is compatible with the politicization of
cultural elites who daim to bring viable and genuine solutions to social,
economic and political problems. in this case the elites involve in politics due
to the fact that they want to feel satisfied because of doing something good for
the society, as well as aspiring to increase the level of society to a higher degree
which they assume to be more congruous with their superior understanding of
values and norms.
Altruistic Behavior (b G) Resignation of a party leader who
believes his action will work on behalf of social harmony can be considered as
a good example of this type.
Malicious Behavior may take many forms in politics. An extremist party
no matter it is leftist or rightist may propose a law in the parliament, which is
impossible to be accepted with the purpose to gain the sympathy of its
followers by provoking and ruining the status-quo.
Spiteful Behavior (b B) When a coalition govemment is constituted
i
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by two parties, one of the parties may choose to dissolve the coalition and leave
" the hold of power aside with the hope that the other one will be harshly
damaged.
Self-serving Behavior (G g) A civil society organization which
daims to work for the environment may have other purposes such as
constituting their dream life by using (not abusing ) the funds and the chances
offered to them.
Selfish Behavior (B g) A state make investments in a foreign
country in order to make more profits knowing that its investment will lead to
hazardous consequences for human health.
Self-torturing Behavior (G b) Militants of an extremist organization
may harın their bodies in order to achieve some goals that are assumed to be of
value for their organization.
Self-destructive Behavior (B ,.b) One of the enthusiasts of an
extremist organization rnay fire at the members of parliament knowing that s/he
will be punished for that action.
It is possible to produce many examples of aUitudes that possess
significance for the political aspects of the social stratum. Witlıin this
perspective, it is very hard to deny that ideal socialism is more compatible with
Decent Behavior (g ,..G) than Malicious Behavior (g B). The essence
of capitalism which protnotes competition amongst individuals make people to
involve in Selfish Behavior (B g) because the system per se can not go
beyond a zero sum game. There may ofcourse be some deviations from the
general norms and values of the system in terms of individual aUitudes. That is
to say, it is likely to point out some individuals within an ideal socialist system
who prefer Selfish (B g) and/or Malicious (g B) behavior. It is also
likely, though as it exists in most of the capitalist societies, to indicate some
people who deliberately follows aDecent (g G) and even Altmistic
(b G) behavior. Therefore, besides its inadequacies such as neglecting
complex explanations of aUitudes such as g (B and G) it seems of utmost
significance to point out that there may be some exceptional contradictions
when this schematic diagram of aUitudes is assumed to represent the
frameworks of various ideologies. in spite of the fact that the divergence of
individual from the generally accepted norms and values (whether be it
capitalist, socialist, fascist, nationalist ete.) is very critical because of indicating
some potential uneasiness, the essence of the ideologies in terms of the ethical
seems the most vital phenomenon. For those, who define the limits of the
ideologies, there may be some coincidences between individual aUitudes, and
the necessities of the relevant ideology. To be more comprehensible; it is more
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likely to act decently for someone who has devoted hislher life for the good of
others. Whilst, this does not necessarily imply that the contradictions between
individual and ideological means are impossible. On the contrary, a fascist
leader who considers ethnie eleansing (B (g and G» an action that serves
for his ideology, may be a very modest, generous and democratic at home and
may even act altruistieally (b G) towards his familyand people.
lt is indispensable to elucidate why people tend to differentiate their
attitudes according to the environment in which they liye. "A responsiye form
of ethies capable of preserving the spirit of response presupposes that not only
the self but also the common ground between the self and the Other is
contested. The contestation occurs in terms of ademand (Anspruch) which
arises simultaneously as a elaim to (Anspruch au/) something and as an appeal
to (Anspruch an) someone" (WALDENFELS, 1995: 42). Nevertheless, the
interaction among demand, elaim to something and appeal to someone can not
indicate individual' s freedom from the general environment which becomes
extremely problematie in the current era characterized by communicative
domination.
3- Contingency of autonomous deed
Among many other moralist theoretician, Kant is one of the most
renowned because of his depieting solid general environment in which the
difference between right and wrong is dictated upon individuals (KANT, 1785).
Indeed Kant elearly defines the line between the right and the wrong, whieh is
similar to good and the bad by emphasizing that some activities are explicitly
wrong from whieh people should be avoided.
"It could however reasonably be argued that he was a
monist, that he argued for onlyone general principle of
absolute duty, and that he thought it could be formulated in
various ways, in the various formulations of the categorical
imperative. Against this, however, a number of points may be
urged. Firstly the various formulations of the categorical
imperative, in particular, Formula 2 (" So act as to use
humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every
other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a
means"), and the other formula (Le. Formula 1" Act only on
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law", la " Act as if the maxim of
your action were to become through your will a Universal Law
of Nature", Formula 3 "So act that your will can regard itself at
i i
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the same time as making universallaw through its maxim", and
3a "So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-
making member in a universal kingdom of ends") differ in their
content, and in what they imply" (MCCLOSKEY, 1969: 199-
200).
Therefore, the normative aspect of Kantian theory is expIicitly open to
harsh criticisms in many aspects. It is not so difficuIt to find cases that hamper
Kantian categories. in addition Kantian categories are a part from explaining
complexity of the relations among individuals as well as individual's
interaction with the concerned system. "If we could prevent the assassination
(after torture) of ten innocent persons only by lying to a member of the secret
police, it would seem clearly to be our duty to lie, and to lie as convincinglyas
we can" (MCCLOSKEY, 1969: 199-200). That is to say, one can assert that a
lie, for instance, may save the Iives of many people, one can also create many
situations where the Kantian wrong activities can be considered within the most
possible highest ethical meaning. Furthermore, it can also be added that it is of
utmost significance to differentiate. between distinct types of lies. Furthermore,
suicide can also be considered as a symbol of high self-respect depending on
the situation as it has once been in the case of Japan.
There can be produced many examples in order to falsify the Kantian
theory of categorical imperative. Whilst, it should also be remembered that,
Kant had once been aware of the deficiencies of his theory. (DELEUZE, 1984)
There is no doubt that Kantian categorical imperatives define a strict general
environment as almost a religion of morality. Nevertheless it should also be
mentioned that ethics represent "good will" at the ultimate meaning and this
good will comes from humans' being free which means that theyare noumenal
as well as phenomenal (KANT, 1788). in other words, morality loses its
essence if it does not coincide with freedom and vice versa. Hence, instead of
harshly criticizing the categorical imperative for its being a theory of absolute
obligation, one must be aware of the fact that, it has, first of all, aimed to
enlighten people to draw the boundaries of their rights and freedoms in the most
simplistic way. Pointing out the exceptions of his theory should have not been a
very hard task for KanL However, such an action could lead to the misuse of his
theory via referring to legalized exceptions.
Whether Kant had the right of defining the good and the bad, as well as
the right and the wrong, may at first sight seem as another troublesome issue.
This traumatic aspect of the issue arises from the fact that, one can never be
sure whether the world we are living in had been inspired by the spirit of g(o)od
or eviL. in other words, what if the ru1es of the bad and evil are more
appropriate for the human soul and, what if those who claim to follow a certain
62 • Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi. 60-3
category of the so called g(o)od have been involved in a universal fallacy.
These attacles are certainly valid to the extent that one can never be sure
whether the universal core is dependent on the g(o)od or the bad, no matter
which one is considered to be the better. in other words, a part from the
controversy of time and place another problem arises from the difficulty of
defining the general good and the bad. as well as the general right and the
wrong. Indeed, the idea of general codes has always been challenged by a
counter argument suggesting "what if your understanding of bad life may be the
good for me?"
This controversy becomes even more complicated in contemporary
societies based on rugged individualism that considers itself above every solid
definition. Such multitude of options work on behalf of the economy based on
consumerism because putting general codes such as good and bad bring at least
restrictive measures upon consumption the act of which starts to be tested
through the existing norms. Nevertheless, emancipating individual definitions
of ethical codes may not always work for politics in its progressive sense. It is
obvious that these attacks can easily be outdated through a mere Kantian
perspective. To do this, a synthetic apriori contemplation of the human
attitudes seems to be enough. This is why contemporary evaporation of ethics
by rugged individualism fundamentally differs from the Benthamite
understanding. If we accept Benthamite perspective by accepting that the
human beings are intrinsically inclined towards pleasure escaping from pain,
then it turns out to be possible to conclude that any action that makes the other
feel a kind of pain is considered to be the wrong (ROSEN, 1983). Nevertheless,
such formulation which seems to bring societal consensus within political
domain contradicts with the economic one because it imposes restrictions upon
consumption decisions. ForBentham the political and economic consequences
seemed compatible because of his bringing a certain defınition of rationality as
a check and balance mechanism. Indeed, simplistic selfish attitudes are not
assumed to create societal disasters. because Bentham considers each of the
acting as an outcome of judgment process based on rational criteria
(BAUMGARDT, 1952).
At fırst sight Kantian strict categorical imperatives seem to contradict
with individual morality of Bentham and selfishness conceptualization of
Smith. At first sight it seems as if Benthamite-Smithian individualism differ
from Kantian like categories, including religion, on the basis of emancipation of
pleasure seeking selfish individual as the leitmotiv of the society. However the
discrepancy occurs because the first one does not count on the individual and
attempts to create a general environment for social good, while the second one
indicates extensive belief in individual's ability to make rational judgment that
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coincides with the social good. Therefore, the real problem is whether not to
count on individual judgments and create strict codes of categorical
imperatives; or to emancipate individual ability of judgment. Deciding about
such controversy becomes very problematic in contemporary society where
clandestine tools of hegemony are so strong by the virtue of media and other
communicative means. Indeed, the controversy between economic and political
domains continues on behalf of the growth of the fırst that costs the corruption
of the second. Individual behavior' s ethical quintessence loses pre-eminence by
raising the significance of the autonomy of the concemed self from the
domination of extemal symbols. The most challenging question that should be
asked here is if going beyond a strict definition ofrationality, or the ethical
because they may not coincide with each other, can be considered as an
indicator of expanded individual freedom. in terms of choices, the individual
increases hislher options by including rationality-irrationality as well as the
ethical and unethical among the choices. Nevertheless, it is not possible to
reach a similar conclusion in terms of individual' s relationship with what takes
place around him/her. in fact there is no doubt that characteristics of the system
vis-a-vis its re-production process define the existing general codes
(BRENKERT, 1998: 98). Therefore, eradication of the general codes per se
indicates anather coding that takes place around the individual before slhe
becomes who slhe is.
This fact has always been real because of institutian' s long lasting life
when compared with intellect's short term presence in society. Heller and Feher
distinguish three typical spheres in all non-tribal societies: the sphere of
everyday life, the sphere of economic and political institutions, and the sphere
of cultural ideas and practices (HELLER and FEHER, 1988: 76 This
differentiation is not so surprising because since Marx many social scientists
have been categorizing society in terms of its social, political and economic
aspects. What makes Heller and F6her interesting is the fact that, they consider
Sittlichkeit (norms, values and prescriptions that are cöllectively accepted) as
the common denaminatar of all of the three social spheres of the pre-modem
times. Furthermore, theyassert that these spheres have been differentiated
under the effect of Sittlichkeit of their own.
"All spheres of modem life thus developed their own
intrinsic norms and rules of Sittlichkeit, though not always to
the same degree. Yet there are so few norms actually shared by
all of them thatskeptical and pessimistic theorists could
plausibly argue that spheres of life are both irreducible to one
anather and irreconcilable in terms of their value content. This,
for instance, was Weber's standpoint. Nowadays, we have no
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reason to be skepticaI. For example, we reject racism and
sexism in aıı spheres and, at least theoreticaııy, to an equal
degree in each. This indicates that a kind of common ethos is
stilI present or that it has presented itself once again... We
would term such an ethos a 'loose ethos' "(HELLER and
FEHER, 1988: 76).
The modem loose ethos therefore distinguishes from the primordial
dense ethos, which had once been determined by the norms of the pre-modem
Sittlichkeit that is to say, a kind of common virtue, which plays a crucial role in
aıı of the aspects of the social, economic and cuItural spheres. Above aıı, the
contemporary society can be best delineated as the aberration of the image from
the essence, which at the same time is perceived as the reality.
"Baudriııard depicts the contemporary capitalist body
politic as hyperkinetic. Everything tingIes, radiates,
reverberates. Aıı is in flux, everything is reflected or refracted
through various media, speed is hypnotic, there is a camival of
hyper-real appearances, an appetite for excitement. The advent
of what Marcuse dubbed 'repressiye desublimation', releasing a
long repressed libidinal hedonism in a shout of 'I want it now',
produces a hyper-aesthetized mass hysteria throughout the
body politico-economic, a multimedia whirl of 'floating
signifiers'. BaudrilIard offers an evocatiye, if impressionistic,
picture of contemporary capitalism. What needs to be
emphasized from the historical viewpoint is that this
characterization of capitalism as a fevered, frenzied epidemic
of signs is not applicable solely to Iate capitalism. At least
since the seventeenth century, capitalism has been inseparable
from the incitement of imagination, the creation of blitz of
speculation, fantasy, fiction, hyper-stimulation -and from the
attendant destabilizing mental and emotional disturbances"
(PORTER, 1993: 5-6).
When the peculiarities of the current post modern era are considered in
terms of aıı kinds of indicators (such as economic, political, social and cultural )
it can be pointed out that almost every occurrence is taking place under the
influence of hegemonic communication. Be it advanced, Iate, and/or post
modem capitalism, its enormous affect is certain. Consequently, a universal
cuIture of consumption based on libidinal coding totaııy outdates discussions
about any other kind of Sittlichkeit by becoming the sole dominant ethics
(LYATARD, 1974). in such a world, selj-realization tums out to be a very
accidental occurrence due to enormous capabilities of capitalism in terms of
----~~~---------------------_ıı
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enlarging its hegemony. Such difficulty completely destructs the assumptions
of fore fathers of competitive individualism, whose theory had been based on
psychological egoism that is accompanied by the contingency of self realizing.
Indeed contemporary tools of communicative hegemony do not only jeopardize
theories based on a pre-determined understanding of ethics, but also dilutes
every positives aspect of individua1İsm by restrieting the contingency of
individual freedom. The hegemonic conimunication and the long repressed
libidinal hedonism of Marcuse, including the hyper-real appearances and the
mass hysteria obtained out of it basically imply a total process of alienation
(PORTER, 1993: 5-6). in a world of hyper-realities, Kantian understanding of
ethics, any kind of Sittlichkeit based on societal evolution as well as progressive
individua1İsm based on competition can sustain their quintessence. Indeed a
new definition of ethics and hyper-Sittlichkeit is being successfully invoked
through hegemonic communication which claims to ernancipate the largest
individual freedom by eradicating the general codes on the favor of
idiosyncratic individual acuities. in reality, fabrication of sclıizophrenia for
emancipation of consumerism which shows itself as more consumption in
economic domain and dilution of everytlıing that decelerates market growth in
political domain constitutes the ultimate general coçling (DELEUZEl
GUATTARI, 1977). In such a simulacrum it is not possible to igentify
eradication of the ethical as if it expands individlJal freedom because
simulacrum per se does not allow individual freedom by imposing modes of
thinking and acting in which not morality or immorality but system' s
reproduction İs essential. In fact there is no way other than judging to what
extent the concemed deed is an autonomous outcome of the concemed self or
whether it is a positioning created by the general environment no matter
whether be it affiliated with harmonious or disharmonious attitudes within the
system.
Conclusion
Esoteric paradigms and ethereal ideologies are considered to be
unavailing phenomena in a world characterized by the broadest range of
hegemonic tools obtained from communicative skills. in such a world, it is not
surprising to see the dissolution of generalized strict codes, which somehow
claim to represent consistent sets of norms and values in terms of etlıics.
However, and ironically, what makes the categorical imperative or strict moral
codes to decay claims to expand individual' s free domain by also hampering
the essence of individualism.
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Within this perspective, this artiele tried to show that breaking the ethical
codes into peaces does not necessarily reflect individual freedom. To the extent
that such defınitions refer to individual choices; the contrast between the ethical
and the non-ethical vanishes. in order to minimize possible confusions, this
artiele referred to the concept of Sittlichkeit, which in its original sense depicted
the quintessence of concemed system. The demise of the ethical as a source of
general coding increases the signifıcance of individual judgments along which
not only idiosyncratic understanding of life but also the extent of individual
freedom becomes shaped. As amatter of fact, though strict ethical codes limit
individual liberties, it is a great fallacy to consider the destroction of the ethical
as if it necessarily represents individual freedom. The space left by destruction
of the ethical, which is assumed to represent strict categorical imperatives,
becomes fılled by the unethical or other micro general envİronment leaving no
rooms for individual's idiosyncratic development. This argument has extensive
validity for contemporary societies characterized by communicative domination
based on the deviation of the perceptions from the reality. That is to say, the
theory of deontology is hampered through emancipation of antagonistic
relationships among various identity positions each of which are assumed to
have their own morality.
Within this perspective, the main hypothesis of this artiele is verifıed
because eradication of general codes necessarily increases individual rights by
creating options, but enlargement of individual freedom can be achieved after
self-realizing of the self that necessitates liberalization of individual deed from
artifıcial codes. What constitutes the rationality of judgment, be it based on
morality or immorality, should fırst of all reflect the free will of the self. in
contemporary modem societies that are characterized by communicative
domination and antagonisms among various identity positions, there can be no
other way than to judge the autonomy of the deed with regard to individual
attitudes in order to discem genuine individual freedom and sincerity of
relationships.
Under such dominative environment, it is imperative to differentiate
deontology from updated defınition ofaxiology. This method serves for
understanding whether individual' s identity positioning has been shaped by
extemal factors no matter whether be on the basis of the ethical or non-ethical
or whether individual's initiatives are outcome of hislher free will. Hence, what
constitutes the Sittlichkeit, no matter whether be it related to wisdom or any
other personal acuity that may even contradict with what is assumed to be wise,
should fırst of all reflect the free will of the self. This condusion brings out the
necessity to test individual's interaction wİth the system İn terms of a
Sittlichkeit as freedom.
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